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Kant on mental disorder. Part 2: Philosophical implications of Kant’s account

Whitman College, USA, frierspr{at}whitman.edu

This paper considers various philosophical problems arising from Kant’s account of mental disorder. Starting with the reasons why Kant considered his theory of mental disorder important, I then turn to the implications of this theory of Kant’s metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Given Kant’s account of insanity as ‘a totally different standpoint ... from which one sees all objects differently’ (7: 216), the Critique of Pure Reason should be read as offering a more social epistemology than typically recognized. Also, mental disorders that seem to undermine human freedom and rationality raise problems for Kant’s moral philosophy that his pragmatic anthropology helps to mitigate. Finally, I propose some implications of Kant’s account of mental disorder for contemporary work on mental illness.

Key Words: epistemology • ethics • freedom • Kant • mental illness • superstition

History of Psychiatry, Vol. 20, No. 3, 290-310 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0957154X08337644


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